PCBaller World/Poland/Eastern Crisis

The situation known as the Eastern Crisis (Kryzys wschodni) in PSNR, Great Lithuania War (Wielka wojna litewska) in The Eastern Polish Republic and Eastern Antiliberal War (Zahodny antyliberalny wójna) in Republic of Sorbia was a conflict between the PSNR and FRWPIL which resulted in the treaty of baranovichi

Background
During the 13-day civil war, the Porajists and the Lithuanian separatists were not fully eradicated due to the Polish army and police being preoccupied with fighting Sorbia in the west. As a result, an Eastern democratic anti-government movement emerged. When the Zgorzelec treaty was signed, the Porajist government realized that they could not depend on the Polish army and police being busy in the west. Therefore, they launched a grand offensive in the Republic of Belarus, which was then led by Lukashenko. This strategy worked initially, as Porajists and democratists took control of important cities in Belarus. However, Poland intervened to assist its ally, the Belorussians, from falling into the hands of westernists, which escalated the conflict into a full-scale war. The Porajists established their own government in the east, which was not recognized by the government in Warsaw. The conflict eventually involved most of the international community.

Opening operations
Initially, the war exhibited a high degree of fluidity, characterized by maneuver warfare as the prevailing and effective strategy employed by both sides. The Polish army concentrated its efforts on securing Ruthenia and Belarus, but encountered challenges in these regions due to the emergence of guerilla warfare. Consequently, the Polish army lost control over these territories.

In contrast, the FRWPIL prioritized establishing a relatively stable front and enhancing its military organization. While the Polish army remained engaged in confronting the Belarussian and Ruthenian forces, the FRWPIL initiated diplomatic channels with the European Commonwealth and directed its forces northward, leading to the proclamation of an independent Lithuania in Vilnius. Subsequently, the European Commonwealth intervened in the conflict, resulting in the swift advancement of their armies through Lithuania. Their progress was only halted by Sorbian troops at Ciechanów. As Sorbian forces fortified the Polish frontlines, the PSNR managed to push back and advance all the way to Riga, culminating in the Riga Agreement. This agreement entailed the disengagement of Sorbia and the European Commonwealth from the war, allowing the PSNR to focus its efforts on combating the FRWPIL.

However, due to logistical constraints and limited supplies, the PSNR faced setbacks and was gradually forced to retreat, relinquishing control over the territories claimed by the FRWPIL. Moreover, the FRWPIL initiated aerial bombardments on PSNR defenses in Brest and Grodno, signaling preparations for a major offensive against the Social Nationalist government.

Triple Offensive
While the FRWPIL's bombing campaign had dire consequences for the inhabitants of the eastern regions of the PSNR, the ZZ, facing significant casualties and attrition, underwent a process of radicalization, adopting ultranationalist ideologies. In response, the ZZ launched an extensive recruitment campaign in collaboration with the Polish army to bolster their forces. Concurrently, the PSNR entered into an agreement with the remnants of Russia, whereby Russian armed forces would engage the FRWPIL armies, allowing the PSNR to execute an offensive aimed at establishing a connection to Minsk. This strategic move served the dual purpose of providing support to Finland in its preparations to defend against the Sacred Kingdom of Sweden while also enabling the PSNR to generate revenue through investments in the Finnish military, thereby sustaining ongoing operations against the FRWPIL.

After a month of concerted campaigning and enduring bombings in the eastern regions of the PSNR, the army achieved readiness and positioned itself in north Kaliningrad. Advancing into the FRWPIL-occupied zones of Brest and Grodno, the PSNR encountered resistance. In the Klaipeda area, the offensive made significant progress, reaching the city; however, naval bombardment from the FRWPIL navy compelled the PSNR army to withdraw, pursued by local Lithuanian independence fighters. Near Grodno, the army directed its efforts towards Wilno in an attempt to prompt the FRWPIL's capitulation. Despite a successful offensive, the army was only able to reach the outskirts of the heavily fortified city and, due to logistical constraints, could not proceed with a further invasion.

However, with assistance from the Russians, the Brest offensive unfolded seamlessly, securing key transportation and infrastructure systems along with a 15-kilometer buffer zone occupied by the PSNR. This development allowed for the substantial sale of equipment to Finland, resulting in an influx of funds into the country. Recognizing the vital importance of safeguarding this transportation route, the PSNR was prepared to defend it at all costs.

Polish-Belarussian zone establishment
Recognizing the necessity of establishing legitimacy and control over the crucial road network leading to Minsk, the PSNR devised a strategic approach. In this regard, the PSNR elevated Alexander Lukashenko, the former president of Belarus, to the position of a PSNR general. Under his leadership, small divisions were recruited to operate within the PSNR forces. Consequently, the PSNR army officially declared the establishment of the Polish-Belarussian zone, designed as a temporary occupation to safeguard the road until the eventual restoration of the Republic of Belarus.

Simultaneously, a large-scale anti-FRWPIL propaganda campaign was launched in the region, aimed at shaping public sentiment and garnering support. The PSNR also made significant investments in expanding and enhancing the size and quality of its armed forces. Among both the PSNR society and government, there existed an unwavering commitment to the principle that the Polish-Belarussian zone must be steadfastly maintained, irrespective of the costs involved.

Frozen period
As the war fronts reached a state of relative stability, the FRWPIL grew weary and sought to assert their perspective to the international community. They contended that the Polish-Belarussian zone was unlawfully occupied, emphasizing their declaration of independence in Vilnius as encompassing not only Lithuania but also Belarus and Volhynia. In pursuit of support, they engaged with influential powers such as Greater Illinois, Byzantium, the Liberal Federation of America, and the European Commonwealth. The heightened attention on the Eastern crisis prompted the PSNR to seek allies, ultimately leading to the formation of numerous stringent mutual defense pacts with neighboring countries. Additionally, the establishment of the New Warsaw Pact between Norway-Sweden, the new Communist Russian government, and the PSNR emerged as a response to these developments. Interestingly, it is noteworthy that the Eastern Crisis played a significant role in fostering amicable relations between the PSNR and the Neo-Soviet Union.

These new alliances, coupled with the growing strength of the PSNR army, facilitated the continuous occupation and control of the southern portion of the Vilnius offensive, which underwent reorganization and was established as the Wilno Voivodeship, alongside the Polish-Belarussian zone. Remarkably, for almost a decade, these borders remained unchanged.

Meanwhile, the dwindling resources of the FRWPIL were allocated towards organizing a Ukrainian revolt within the southeastern region of the PSNR. Consequently, both the PSNR and the FRWPIL refrained from launching any offensive actions in the ensuing years. The FRWPIL, exhausted and facing financial strain, struggled to sustain its operations, while the PSNR focused on fortifying its defenses to uphold control over the Polish-Belarussian zone and suppress the Ukrainian insurrection in its southeastern territories.

Recognizing the increasing flow of Western support directed towards the FRWPIL, the PSNR acknowledged the challenge of achieving victory in the war alone, even with the backing of allies. Despite experiencing ongoing incidents with Greater Illinois, both sides exhibited a reluctance to display signs of weakness, preventing the PSNR from approaching Greater Illinois directly. However, when Greater Illinois initiated contact with the PSNR following the PSNR's recapture of Tarnopol from the Ukrainian insurrection, which significantly weakened the Ukrainian Liberation Army's structure, the PSNR swiftly and proactively engaged in détente talks. One of the key focal points of these discussions was the Eastern Crisis.

Subsequently, the signing of the Treaty of Chicago instilled the PSNR with a newfound confidence. This prompted the PSNR to issue a final ultimatum to the FRWPIL, demanding the renouncement of their claim over the Polish-Belarussian zone and the facilitation of a plebiscite in Northern Belarus, aiming to establish a lasting peace in the region. Regrettably, the FRWPIL declined the PSNR's ultimatum. Consequently, the PSNR army, after nearly a decade of frozen conflict and internal strife, embarked on the Continuation War and initiated the Marijampole offensive, marking a resumption of hostilities.

Continuation war
The armed forces of the PSNR directed their efforts towards the region of Lithuania, with a primary objective of capturing Wilno. However, the city proved to be heavily fortified by the FRWPIL during the period of frozen conflict, essentially transforming it into an impregnable fortress. In response, the PSNR forces adopted a strategic approach, prioritizing the capture of strategically significant cities near the border to address the logistical challenges encountered in the initial stages of the Eastern Crisis.

Simultaneously, in the southern sector of the front, the PSNR army concentrated its efforts on Pruzhany and Dubno, aiming to catch LFA volunteers off guard in these areas. While some encirclement maneuvers were partially successful, the LFA volunteers managed to evade capture for an extended duration. The PSNR army faced significant obstacles in capturing Wilno, with intense battles resulting in high casualties and limited progress in terms of gaining control over a few buildings at a time. Consequently, a decision was made to shift focus towards encircling Wilno and implementing a strategy of besiegement to exhaust the city's resources. Additionally, a separate contingent occupied Marijampole to secure an improved supply route in support of the front around Wilno.

The forces of the Eastern Roman Republic, consisting of dedicated volunteers, strategically withdrew from Wilno upon recognizing that the PSNR had halted their assault on the city. They redirected their efforts towards the northern sector of the Polish-Belarussian zone, swiftly and effectively capturing the entire road network from Skidzyel’ to Minsk within a matter of days. The volunteers refrained from attempting to recapture the PSNR-controlled areas in Wilno due to the presence of the Indonesian Expeditionary Army, which had implemented a scorched earth policy that rendered subsequent offensives in the region highly challenging. Instead, the volunteers shifted their focus southward, launching successful attacks and securing the towns of Stara Vyzhivka and Liuboml within a matter of hours. Their objective was to eventually capture Chełm, further advancing their campaign in the region.

Byzantine Pullout
As the Polish-Belarussian zone faced relentless attacks, the PSNR army intensified its offensive in the Lithuania region, capturing additional cities of limited strategic significance with the aim of undermining the morale of the FRWPIL armed forces. Concurrently, as the Chełm offensive commenced, the Kultokrat embarked on a diplomatic mission to Athens, presenting a peace treaty proposal to the FRWPIL. While aware of the unlikelihood of its acceptance, the Kultokrat sought to enhance the PSNR's international standing and potentially sway the Eastern Roman Republic to disengage from the FRWPIL by making this appearance. Despite the proposed treaty's favorable terms, the FRWPIL rejected it. The Eastern Roman Empire actively advocated for the FRWPIL's acceptance, aiming to alleviate tensions in the region and secure a beneficial agreement. With the New Warsaw Pact nations, including Norway-Sweden and the Neo-Soviet Union, increasingly supporting the PSNR, the potential for escalation loomed, a prospect the Eastern Roman Republic sought to avoid, particularly amidst the ongoing Byzantine-Balkan incident. Following the FRWPIL's repeated refusal of the treaty, the Eastern Roman Republic made the decision to withdraw from the conflict, with leaders from both Greater Illinois and the Eastern Roman Republic expressing concern over what they perceived as the FRWPIL's self-destructive disposition.

Following the withdrawal of the Eastern Roman Republic from the FRWPIL, the FRWPIL's international reputation suffered a significant decline due to its aforementioned self-destructive behavior. Consequently, increased support rallied behind the PSNR, notably from nations such as Norway-Sweden and the Indonesian Empire. In a coordinated effort, the Soviet Union and Indonesia initiated a relentless joint bombing campaign alongside the PSNR, targeting Wilno and other major FRWPIL strongholds and military installations. The devastating bombardment severely compromised the FRWPIL's defenses in Wilno and inflicted substantial casualties upon their armed forces. This strategic weakening rendered the FRWPIL more vulnerable to subsequent incursions by the advancing PSNR forces across the nation.

Ending operations
Following the withdrawal of the Eastern Roman Republic and the progressive weakening of the FRWPIL, the PSNR embarked on a series of offensives along the entire front line. Notably, the Ratne Pocket witnessed a significant turning point as the LFA volunteers were encircled, resulting in approximately 60% of fighters surrendering and returning home, while the remaining 40% were executed for their refusal to surrender. In the Battle of Wilno, the Haldorsson Selskap, employing innovative close-quarters combat tactics and state-of-the-art equipment provided by Norway-Sweden, effectively demolished the remaining FRWPIL fortifications in Wilno. The Indonesian Expeditionary Army's recapture of the Polish-Belarussian zone was accompanied by intense fighting and a highly destructive bombing campaign, although the intervention by ZZ limited the extent of damage, ensuring the region remains inhabitable. The PSNR's successful encirclement of the North Lithuanian pockets resulted in a high rate of surrender among the FRWPIL forces, with approximately 90,000 prisoners of war subsequently were put in labour camps within the PSNR. Finally, on the 14th of May, the signing of the treaty of Baranovichi marked a significant milestone, and within hours of its signing, the remnants of the FRWPIL army in eastern Volhynia, now lacking a government, surrendered. This date has since been commemorated as a national holiday within the PSNR.

=Consequences= Treaty of Baranovichi

The Eastern crisis played a significant role in further bolstering the ranks and influence of the ZZ. However, following their failed coup attempt against Hubert Ziółkowski, the Kultokrat of Poland, the ZZ has been subject to stringent oversight and control measures.

=Cultural Impact=

[[File:PSNRball.png]] The Polish Social Nationalist Republic
Initially, within the PSNR, the Eastern Crisis was perceived as a defensive war against Western collective forces, seen as a safeguarding of their homeland against separatism and societal decline. Speculations emerged that Poland might become the 51st state of the United States in the event of their defeat, and the Polish elite regarded themselves as the final bastion of the old Eastern order, given the collapse of China and the Russian Federation. However, following the Treaty of Chicago and the Athens Conference, the PSNR's perspective underwent a transformation. The war came to be viewed as: The war also inspired various songs, such as "To jest moja ojczyzna" (This is My Homeland), "March of Polish Kresy," and "Rota 27," while fostering a general sense of mutual antipathy between Poles and Lithuanians.
 * A significant diplomatic success for the Ziółkowskist doctrine, which emphasized engaging with the West when it served Poland's interests. This stood in contrast to the radical factions within the PSNR, which advocated for the dismantling and destruction of the Western collective.
 * A necessary intervention by the PSNR's military in the region to prevent both the people and, more importantly, the formidable weaponry of the FRWPIL from remaining under the control of an obstinate and self-destructive government and leadership. The prevailing belief was that the PSNR was saving the world from potential catastrophe and the complete breakdown of global peace.

[[File:NSAK pixels,png.png]] The Norwegian-Sweden Anarchist Collective
The Eastern Crisis had a significant cultural impact on the Norwegian public. As Norway-Sweden was a member of the New Warsaw Pact and actively involved in the conflict, the war stirred strong emotions and evoked patriotism among the population. It brought about a renewed sense of national unity and solidarity as Norwegians rallied behind their troops and supported their efforts in the war. The conflict also sparked widespread discussions and debates about the values and principles that Norway-Sweden stood for as a nation. The Norse Futurism design aesthetic, prevalent in the country's military technology, became a symbol of national identity and innovation. The fusion of ancient Norse heritage with futuristic elements captured the imagination of the public, highlighting the unique cultural blend that characterized Norway-Sweden. Moreover, the war prompted a reevaluation of the country's defense capabilities and sparked a sense of pride in Norway-Sweden's military prowess. The introduction of new standardized tank models and advanced energy weapons showcased the nation's technological advancements and its commitment to protecting its interests and those of its allies.

[[File:Greater_IL.png]] Greater Illinois
While the material losses sustained by Greater Illinois were relatively minimal (only around <100 human commanders/operators were lost) and easily replaced by its massive economy, the Eastern Crisis has probably had the most significant impact on Illinoisian foreign policy since this was the first time where Illinois pulled out of a clandestine conflict due to pragmatic reasons. Greater Illinois withdrew in the first place because a peaceful PSNR would be more useful as a long-term potential ally than a suicidally stubborn EPR besieged on all sides with no end in sight and no time to rebuild, even with the might of Greater Illinois's economy. This began the trend of Illinois dropping most of its hardline ideological grudges for the sake of pragmatism. Nevertheless, given the nature of the conflict and the Treaty of Chicago, Greater Illinois does not consider the outcome of the EPR as a military loss and more of a special situation. Internationally, Greater Illinois' standing increased highly with the NWP bloc and decreased a little with the GTO bloc, as expected. Relationships were fully realized with Norway-Sweden and Hungary as a result. Illinois' greatest ally, Byzantium, was skeptical of the PSNR and initially ignored Illinoisian warnings to withdraw from the Eastern Crisis. Still, eventually, they heeded our advice and relations were brought back to normal in light of the recent Indonesia debacle. Other than the detente with the PSNR, the most significant development for Illinois was with the Hungarian state, which led to a mutually beneficial treaty and trade facilitation between the two countries. The technology developed during the period, especially military technology, could sometimes be linked to the Eastern Crisis. This was especially prevalent in the efforts to make the Laser Matrix, Illinois's now-international anti-nuclear network, far less bulky and much easier and quicker to construct due to the potential fear of nuclear war before and after the Treaty of Chicago. Culturally, Greater Illinois wasn't impacted as much, but the population initially had mixed reactions to the Illinoisian withdrawal. Some people, particularly members of The Solution, were upset that a potential Casus Belli against the Neo-Soviet Union might have been squandered. More commonly, there was indeed an air of distrust towards the PSNR during the first few months that the Treaty of Chicago was active, which dissipated as Polish goods entered domestic Illinoisian markets, deals were made with Polish businesses on an international scale, and Polish cultural impact (particularly in the film industry) was felt throughout the country. The Treaty of Chicago also made realizing the American Reunification Initiative's goals much harder, but we're finding solutions. Finally, to nobody's surprise, the whole Eastern Crisis had an infinitesimally small microeconomic impact on Greater Illinois's infrastructure and economic capacities. However, macroeconomically, Illinois decided to fund independent companies less directly and fiscal policy became more hands-off.

[[File:TheNightmare.png]] Indonesia
The Eastern Crisis Has Been Seen As A Great Crusader Against The Lithuanian Devil In Many Indonesian Propaganda Even There Is A Movie Called The East Produced By The Indonesian Ministry Of Public Enlightenment And Propaganda The movie is about a soldier who leaves his love to fight in the Eastern Crisis. Other than that, Indonesians benefit from these conflicts by supplying weapons to both sides and plundering and raping Lithuanian women. Many in Europe refer to the Second Deluge as a great plundering of all Lithuanian treasure, which has now been kept by the Indonesian government. When the Treaty of Jakarta was signed, Indonesia began withdrawing from Poland and freeing all Lithuanian women who had been kidnapped.Until today, the End of the Eastern Crisis has been declared a national holiday, and the Indonesian government has hailed all war crimes as acts of patriotism.

[[File:Cball-Byzantine.png]] Byzantium
While initially Byzantine involvement in the war was seen as an expansion of liberal democracy in Europe, it would turn out that Mitrides was actually not so in favor of this interpretation that was believed in by people such as Akakios Stamoglou (an important advisor to Mitrides), as he refused to send in further units to fight in the Eastern Crisis, as PSNR had put up a blockade soon after the Byzantine units that were already sent in had landed.

This turned out to be a good decision, as it prevented a potential World War between the Global Treaty Organization and the New Warsaw Pact. As such, Mitrides changed the focus on the war not on creating a new democratic regime in Poland (as Stamoglou had proposed) and had rather decided to ensure a peace treaty and a peaceful withdrawal of Byzantine forces. While Byzantine troops were able to peacefully withdraw from Poland (with Byzantium only having 100 casualties, with them inflicting more on the enemy side), FRWPIL would reject this new peace treaty, which would lead to the Treaty of Baranovichi, which would create the Ruthenian Salvation Area and end the FRWPIL.

It is said that this war involvement was the reason Mitrides fired Stamoglou from the Advisory Council and was replaced, however it is not known whether Mitrides had a grudge on Stamoglou or if Stamoglou simply did not want to be an advisor anymore. But what is for certain is that this war has changed Byzantium's foreign policy to be more pragmatic, making them more willing to cooperate with the NWP, as seen when Mitrides appointed Owfithus (former PM) to the advisory council and also joined COMECON, cementing Byzantium's pragmatic turn.

In turns of popular sentiment, people initially were in favor of Byzantine participation in the war, however this soon changed as it felt like Byzantium's participation was stubborn. This decision has been called Mitrides's greatest blunder, however he is trying to make up for it, knowing the gravity of his mistake. His public approval did temporarily go down from 66% to 58% as a result of this participation, and through this war came a new political revolution, not just from politicians but also of the populace themselves, one which sought pragmatism and peace, over hawkishness and idealism.

=Proposed peaces=

PSNR ultimatum
According to the Treaty of Chicago, it was stipulated that if the FRWPIL were to reject the ultimatum negotiated between Greater Illinois and the PSNR, Greater Illinois would withdraw from the FRWPIL and cease the supply of military equipment. The ultimatum demanded the FRWPIL's recognition of the Polish-Belarusian zone and the occupied areas of Wilno as part of the PSNR, as well as a permanent cessation of hostilities between the two countries. In exchange, the PSNR would assist in the reconstruction of cities that had suffered extensive bombing by the PSNR forces, and the FRWPIL would be granted access to the infrastructure network within the Polish-Belarusian zone. Mutual recognition as legitimate states would be established between the PSNR and the FRWPIL, and a plebiscite would be conducted in the territory between the Wilno Voivodeship and the Polish-Belarusian zone to determine its territorial affiliation. However, the ultimatum was outright rejected by the FRWPIL, asserting that the Polish-Belarusian zone was an integral part of their own territory. Consequently, as a result of the FRWPIL's rejection of the ultimatum, Greater Illinois made the decision to withdraw from the FRWPIL, leading to the initiation of the Continuation War.

Visegrad Conference
The Visegrad conference served as Hungary's diplomatic endeavor to reconcile divergences and achieve a consensus regarding the contested region between the PSNR and FRWPIL. Although the PSNR displayed eagerness by participating in the conference held at Visegrad, the delegation representing the FRWPIL failed to attend. Nonetheless, Hungary was presented with a draft treaty that would have materialized had the PSNR ultimatum been accepted, and it was generally regarded favorably by the Hungarian leadership.

Budapest Conference
Following Hungary's persistent efforts to facilitate a meeting between the two parties, a subsequent gathering was arranged in Budapest, where the FRWPIL delegation eventually arrived. They were presented with the PSNR ultimatum, now presented as a treaty, accompanied by the stipulation that the PSNR would undertake liberalizing measures within its internal governance. However, the FRWPIL once again declined the proposal, citing the same grounds as previously stated.

Second PSNR ultimatum
As the PSNR continued its territorial expansion into the FRWPIL, causing further destruction to infrastructure and severely impacting the overall economic state of the FRWPIL, a second ultimatum was dispatched. This ultimatum carried the threat of intensified bombing campaigns and heightened brutality in warfare should it be rejected. The terms of the ultimatum closely mirrored the initial PSNR ultimatum, with the notable distinction that the FRWPIL would be compelled to withdraw from the GTO and adopt a neutral stance. This neutrality would entail strict prohibitions on joining military organizations and hosting foreign bases. However, the FRWPIL once again refused to accept the ultimatum, citing confidence in its technological capabilities to deter large-scale bombing raids.

FRWPIL ultimatum
At a certain juncture following the capture of the Polish-Belarussian zone by Eastern Rome volunteers, the FRWPIL presented an ultimatum to the PSNR. The ultimatum demanded the complete withdrawal of the PSNR from the remaining portion of the Polish-Belarussian zone and the voivodeship of Wilno under its control, as well as the payment of war reparations. Additionally, the FRWPIL called for the liberalization of the PSNR's internal governance systems. In return, the FRWPIL offered to cease its financial support of Ukrainian independence organizations operating within the PSNR. The specific consequences for rejecting the ultimatum were not clearly outlined. However, when the PSNR eventually declined the terms, the response entailed a continuation of military actions and marked the commencement of an offensive toward Chełm.

Athens Conference
Initially, both the FRWPIL and the PSNR dismissed the idea of holding a conference in Athens. The FRWPIL sought to impose its ultimatum as the desired outcome, while the PSNR viewed the prospect as futile due to the FRWPIL's perceived obstinacy. However, as the Chełm offensive loomed and the PSNR escalated its war efforts by increasing military spending, Greater Illinois called upon the Eastern Roman Republic to reconsider hosting the conference in Athens. The concern was fueled by the fear of further escalation and potential involvement of the Soviet Union, which had initiated bombing raids on the FRWPIL. This time, the PSNR demonstrated a willingness to participate, driven by the loss of the Polish-Belarussian zone and the recognition that, similar to the Treaty of Chicago, the PSNR could seek Eastern Rome's withdrawal from the FRWPIL in the event of rejection of the consensus. During the conference, an agreement was reached that closely resembled the initial PSNR ultimatum. However, additional provisions were included, such as the liberalization of certain aspects of the PSNR regime. Furthermore, the scope of the plebiscite area expanded to encompass the entirety of Belarus, excluding the Polish-Belarussian zone. The FRWPIL rejected this proposal, resulting in the withdrawal of the Eastern Roman Republic from the FRWPIL.

Jakarta Summit
Subsequently, following the successful PSNR retaking of the Polish-Belarussian zone and the ongoing counteroffensive that effectively nullified the Chełm offensive, Indonesia proposed a peace initiative to the PSNR. The proposal outlined that the PSNR would gain control over the Polish-Belarus zone and the Wilno voivodeship, while the FRWPIL would assume a subordinate position as a tributary or puppet state under the PSR. The PSNR initially viewed this proposition favorably. However, during the actual summit, a different peace proposal was put forward. The revised plan primarily focused on ceasing anti-propaganda activities between the two parties, establishing a demilitarized zone, and granting the PSNR control over the Polish-Belarussian zone and Wilno. Notably, this proposal omitted any mention of the FRWPIL's obligation to become a puppet state or tributary, excluded the holding of a plebiscite in Belarus, and did not enforce the FRWPIL's neutrality or restrict its participation in military alliances. Furthermore, the FRWPIL sought to levy war reparations on the PSNR. Consequently, the PSNR rejected the treaty, considering the FRWPIL to be in a weakened state and deeming the terms unsatisfactory. The proposed agreement also faced substantial criticism from Norway-Sweden, a significant participant in the war at that stage.

Treaty of Baranovichi
During the final days of the war, as the PSNR advanced into the remaining territories of northern Lithuania and the remnants of the FRWPIL in Ruthenia, a decision was made not to annex either region. The PSNR leadership expressed their reasons for this stance, stating that they did not wish to appear imperialistic, disrupt the ethnic diversity within their borders further, undertake the extensive task of rebuilding the territories, and potentially face resistance issues associated with annexation. In a letter to Hungary, the PSNR conveyed their intentions. Considering the challenges of establishing an independent government in a war-ravaged country like Lithuania, the PSNR approached the European Commonwealth, proposing that they consider annexing the region after the war in exchange for certain benefits and improved relations. The European Commonwealth agreed to this proposal. Furthermore, the PSNR aimed to create an independent Ruthenian state within Volhynia. This approach was driven by their desire to avoid an influx of additional Ukrainians into their borders. In return for granting the Ruthenians their own state, the PSNR sought concessions from Ruthenian institutions within Poland to mitigate ongoing resistance issues, particularly concerning rural Ruthenians protesting against the PSNR's rule. Byzantium offered to send the Ukrainian government in exile to govern Ruthenia, and the PSNR accepted this arrangement with certain conditions. As part of the agreement, Ruthenia would be compelled to maintain geopolitical neutrality, preventing its membership in military organizations. Additionally, the Ukrainian government in exile would assume governance over Ruthenia, alongside representatives from the FRWPIL army (Ruthenia sector) and representatives from the Tarnopol voivodeship within the PSNR. The inclusion of the FRWPIL army in the state's governance was a condition set by the FRWPIL partisans in Eastern Volhynia as a prerequisite for their surrender. On May 14th, following the announcement of the signing of the Treaty of Baranovichi by the PSNR, the last remnants of the FRWPIL surrendered, marking the end of the Eastern crisis.